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Human Rights and Development: 
Putting Power and Politics at the Center
Gordon Crawford* & Bård A. Andreassen**
AbSTRACT
Human rights are not primarily technical-legal issues. While much research 
and debate has revolved around the legal nature of human rights, compara-
tively little attention has been offered to their political character. Human 
rights define basic norms, values and interests in human and social life, but 
they are, at the same time, always secured or denied in political and social 
contexts of power, and situations of competition over resources. This article 
reports on a research project that made detailed empirical analyses of how 
different forms of power constrain human rights activism in six different 
countries, and examines the construction of countervailing empowerment 
to challenge such power structures. It argues that more systematic analytical 
attention should be paid to power and political analysis of human rights 
in development contexts.
I. INTRoDUCTIoN
For a long time human rights and international development “lived in splen-
did isolation.”1 In the mid to late 1990s, however, a convergence of human 
rights norms and strategic thinking about development occurred, and a hu-
man rights-based approach to development emerged in which the objective 
of development became the realization of human rights.2 Often referred to 
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  1. Peter Uvin, HUman rigHts and develoPment 1 (2004).
  2. Id. at 122–66; reinventing develoPment? translating rigHts-based aPProacHes from tHeory into 
Practice (Paul Gready & Jonathan Ensor eds., 2005).
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simply as rights-based approaches, the “rise of rights” within international 
development has been well documented3 and inclusive of the historical and 
contextual factors that accounted for the emergence of rights-based develop-
ment.4 By the late 1990s and early 2000s, many international development 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) enthusiastically adopted human 
rights-based approaches, notably ActionAid, Save the Children, Oxfam, 
and Care International, as well as by a number of official governmental 
and intergovernmental development agencies, for instance, UK Department 
for International Development (DFID), Swedish International Development 
Agency (SIDA), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP).5 Local NGOs and social move-
ments also adopted human rights-based approaches.6 
During the rise of rights in development policy and practice in the early 
to mid-2000s, the transformative potential of rights-based approaches was 
noted, especially how they may resonate with transformative versions of 
participation.7 Indeed, a rights-based approach was seen by Andrea Cornwall 
and Celestine Nyamu-Musembi as “sharpen[ing] the political edges of partici-
pation in the wake of the instrumentalism produced by mainstreaming and to 
make critical linkages between participation, accountability and citizenship.”8 
Such enthusiasm focused on the agency of rights claimants and on processes 
of local political action such as grassroots mobilization, collective action, 
and advocacy, as much as on the outcomes of such agency. Similarly, Paul 
Gready highlighted the claim that rights-based approaches could potentially 
“re-politicize development” in the positive sense of re-framing development 
as entitlement and re-orientating development from “technical solutions to 
socio-political action,”9 while Cornwall and Nyamu-Musembi noted that a 
  3. Rosalind Eyben, The Rise of Rights: Rights-Based Approaches to International Develop-
ment. IDS Policy Briefing 17 (2003); maxine molyneUx & sian lazar, doing tHe rigHts tHing: 
rigHts-based develoPment and latin american ngos, at ch. 1 (2003); see Uvin, supra note 
1, at 123–28.
  4. Andrea Cornwall & Celestine Nyamu-Musembi, Why Rights, Why Now? Reflections 
on the Rise of Rights in International Development Discourse, 36 develoPing rigHts ids 
bUll. 11–14 (2005); reinventing develoPment?, supra note 2, at 14–28; samUel Hickey & 
diana mitlin, rigHts-based aPProacHes to develoPment: exPloring tHe Potential and Pitfalls 3–8 
(2009).
  5. Andrea Cornwall & Celestine Nyamu-Musembi, Putting the “Rights-Based Approach” to 
Development Into Perspective, 25 tHird World Q. 1415, 1425–30 (2004); Laure-Helene 
Piron, Rights-Based Approaches and Bilateral Aid Agencies: More Than a Metaphor? 
36 develoPing rts. ids bUll. 19 (2005); Mac Darrow & Amparo Tomas, Power, Capture, 
and Conflict: A Call for Human Rights Accountability in Development Cooperation. 27 
HUm. rts. Q. 471 (2005).
  6. Hannah Miller, From “Rights-Based” to “Rights-Framed” Approaches: A Social Con-
structivist View of Human Rights Practice 14 int’l J. HUm. rts. 916 (2010).
  7. Sam Hickey & Giles Mohan, Relocating Participation Within a Radical Politics of De-
velopment 36 dev. & cHange 237, 238 (2005); Cornwall & Nyamu-Musembi, Putting 
the “Rights-Based Approach,” supra note 5, at 1424.
  8. See Cornwall & Nyamu-Musembi, Why Rights, supra note 4, at 10.
  9. Paul Gready, Rights-Based Approaches to Development: What is the Value-Added? 18 
dev. Practice 735, 742–43 (2008).
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rights-based approach could be a “more progressive, radical even, approach 
to development,” 10 with the potential to transform power relations.
At times, however, the same authors simultaneously expressed doubts 
about the extent to which such transformative potential would be realized. 
Peter Uvin, for instance, questioned whether rights-based approaches would 
amount to more than rhetorical “fluff” without a “fundamental reshuffling 
of the cards of power, or a redistribution of resources.”11 Similarly Cornwall 
and Nyamu-Musembi asked whether rights-based approaches will turn out to 
“mean anything more than the latest flurry of cosmetic rhetoric with which 
to sell the same old development.”12 Such uncertainty was based mainly on 
whether actors would adopt a more political approach to securing rights, 
one that contests power inequalities and the unjust distribution of resources.
As we approach two decades from the original rise of a human rights-
based approach, and a decade on from many of these initial academic 
commentaries, this article undertakes an assessment of its relative success 
and failure as a transformative and rights-based development strategy. It 
does so through the lens of power and politics, for the following reasons. 
First, while much literature on human rights-based approaches emphasizes 
the agency of rights-deprived groups in claiming rights and their empow-
erment in doing so, the authors contend that there is a relative neglect of 
those negative power structures, which often act as an obstacle to securing 
rights. Such structures endow various elite groups in society with the power 
to resist claims for rights, especially when such claims are perceived as a 
threat to their interests. In this sense the starting point of this research was 
influenced by Jethro Pettit and Joanna Wheeler’s critique of rights-based 
approaches in which the emphasis on empowerment “fails to address the 
structural causes of marginalisation and the power relations that perpetuate 
those. The assumption is that one sector of society can be empowered without 
necessarily challenging the power of other sectors.”13 Thus, in implementing 
a rights-based approach, Pettit and Wheeler highlighted “the importance of 
analysing and confronting deeply embedded power relations and structural 
barriers on the road to securing rights.”14
Second, this emphasis on power and the power dynamics between the 
relatively powerful and powerless underscores the importance of politics to 
a rights-based approach, as intimated above. It recognizes that struggles for 
human rights are political struggles and that advocacy for citizens’ rights as 
 10. See Cornwall & Nyamu-Musembi, Putting the “Rights-Based Approach,” supra note 5, 
at 1418, 1432.
 11. Peter Uvin, From the Right to Development to the Rights-Based Approach: How “Hu-
man Rights” Entered Development?, 17 dev. Practice 597, 603–04 (2007).
 12. See Cornwall & Nyamu-Musembi, Putting the “Rights-Based Approach,” supra note 5, 
at 1434.
 13. Jethro Pettit & Joanna Wheeler. Developing Rights? Relating Discourse to Context and 
Practice. 36 develoPing rigHts ids bUll. 1, 6 (2005).
 14. Id. at 5.
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a development strategy is embedded in the particular political environment 
within which it occurs. The nature of this political context, for example, the 
level of transparency and accountability of public authorities, is fundamental 
to the extent to which citizens can freely exercise their civil and political 
rights and make claims for people-centered development and other forms 
of rights fulfillment. A rights-based approach, therefore, is not a technical 
exercise, but one that is replete with politics. A number of key authors also 
highlight this point. Uvin noted that human rights claims are a “deeply 
political . . . matter,”15 and Cornwall and Nyamu-Musembi stated that 
“[r]ights talk is above all talk of politics.”16 Laure-Helene Piron emphasized 
“the political nature of the approach” as a strength, in particular the “‘social 
contract’ between the state and citizens empowered to claim their rights.”17 
In the concluding chapter in the Gready and Ensor volume, Olivia Ball 
emphasized that “[a] rights-based approach is thoroughly ‘political,’”18 not 
in a big-P politically partisan sense, but what she calls “small-p, pro-poor 
political action in defiance of power.”19
Thus in the literature of the 2000s that discussed rights-based approaches 
as a potential transformative strategy, the issues of power and politics were 
viewed as at the crux of its likely success or failure. Mac Darrow and Am-
paro Tomas20 noted that “human rights-based approaches compel us deeper 
into analyses of political and social power relationships in the public and 
private spheres.” Writing in the IDS Bulletin, the Sustainable Livelihoods in 
Southern Africa (SLSA) team asked, “How do politics, power and interests 
affect the ability of rights claiming in practice in particular settings?,”21 and 
suggested that “[i]gnoring power and politics . . . results in sure failure . . . 
and capture by those with power.”22 In a similar vein, Cornwall and Nyamu-
Musembi concluded that “a rights-based approach would mean little if it 
has no potential to achieve a positive transformation of power relations.”23 
Rights-based development requires a change in power relations because 
this alters the relative influence of different social groups and interests both 
within political institutions and society at large. A rights-based approach aims 
to secure the human rights of rights-deprived groups through, for example, 
 15. See Uvin, supra note 1, at 134. 
 16. See Cornwall & Nyamu-Musembi, Putting the “Rights-Based Approach,” supra note 5, 
at 1433.
 17. See Piron, supra note 5, at 25.
 18. Olivia Ball, Conclusion, in reinventing develoPment?, supra note 2, at 282.
 19. Id. at 283.
 20. See Darrow & Tomas, supra note 5, at 486.
 21. Sustainable Livelihoods in Southern Africa (SLSA.) Team, Rights Talk and Rights Practice: 
Challenges for Southern Africa in 34 ids bUll. 97–98 (2003).
 22. Id. at 110.
 23. See Cornwall & Nyamu-Musembi, Putting the “Rights-Based Approach,” supra note 5, 
at 1432.
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resource redistribution by means of budget allocations and other political 
mechanisms, which in turn requires power transformation in order to be 
able to define the main issues of the political agenda (for instance, labor 
laws or taxation systems) and to increase the organizational strength and 
influence of people living in situations of poverty. 
Therefore this article contends that understanding the dynamics between 
power structures and the claiming of human rights is necessary in order to 
make the human rights-based approach effective in bringing about those 
changes in policies and in society that it seeks to achieve. Conversely, a lack 
of such an understanding amongst its advocates could lead to a rights-based 
approach becoming another failed development strategy. In undertaking an 
assessment of a human rights-based approach to development, this article 
explores the degree of critical awareness of structures and relations of coer-
cive power amongst rights-promoting organizations and the extent to which 
power inequalities have been addressed. To reach this assessment, we pose 
the following questions: 
•	 In	what	ways	have	power	relations	and	structural	inequalities	con-
strained struggles for human rights in development contexts? 
•	 In	seeking	 to	secure	 rights,	how	and	 to	what	extent	have	nongov-
ernmental human rights promoters been able to challenge power 
structures at both local and national levels?
•	 To	what	extent	have	human	rights-promoting	organizations	success-
fully transformed power structures and secured rights? 
The discussion and assessment below draws on a six-country study to 
examine the interaction between struggles for human rights by NGOs and 
the dynamics of power. This is published in full in the edited volume Hu-
man Rights, Power and Civic Action.24 Small teams of researchers looked at 
country cases in Africa, including Zimbabwe (Chapter 2), Kenya (Chapter 
3), Ghana (Chapter 4), and South Africa (Chapter 5); and in Asia, includ-
ing China (Chapter 6) and Cambodia (Chapter 7). The authors selected 
these six country studies to reflect differing political contexts with regard 
to political regime and degrees of democratization, ranging from relatively 
democratic to autocratic, and thus different political opportunity structures 
for citizen action. The authors draw on the synthesis of the country studies 
in the concluding chapter of the book, while the detailed source materials 
for all country examples referred to below can be found in the respective 
country chapters. Distinctively, this article provides a more specific assess-
ment of the relative success or failure of a human rights-based approach to 
 24. HUman rigHts, PoWer and civic action: comParative analyses of strUggles for rigHts in devel-
oPing coUntries (Bård. A. Andreassen & Gordon Crawford eds., 2013).
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development, highlighting the importance of bringing power and politics 
back into the center of analysis.
The following three sections address the three research questions in 
turn, with evidence provided from the country case-studies. The conclu-
sion then provides an overall assessment of the relative success or failure 
of a human rights-based approach to development before offering some 
final thoughts on the significance of putting politics and power back at the 
center of analysis if a rights-based approach is to offer a more realistic and 
effective development approach.
II. PowER CoNSTRAINTS oN HUMAN RIGHTS STRUGGLES
Power is a complex and contested concept. Steven Lukes’ classic work defines 
three dimensions of power—visible, hidden and invisible.25 Visible power 
is where person “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do 
something that B would not otherwise do,”26 and applies to political decision 
making in which there is an actual, and thus observable, conflict of interests. 
Lukes refers to situations of differing policy preferences in particular,27 but 
visible power could also pertain to different social class interests. “Hidden 
power” extends the scope of power to control over the agenda of political 
decision making, i.e. the power to determine which issues can be discussed 
and which are excluded from the agenda as detrimental to the interests of 
the powerful, referred to as a sphere of non-decision making.28 The third 
dimension, invisible or internalized power, entailed two significant additions 
by Lukes. First, power relations are not just about individual acts but also 
those collective actions associated with social forces. Second, power can 
operate to shape and control people’s desires and beliefs contrary to their 
interests, for instance, “through the control of information, through the mass 
media and through processes of socialization.”29 In other words, power is 
exercised invisibly by “influencing, shaping or determining [people’s] very 
wants.”30 These different dimensions of “power over” are all forms of nega-
tive power, given that they involve authority and coercion.31
 25. steven lUkes, PoWer: a radical vieW 25–29 (2d ed. 2005) (1974).
 26. Id. at 16.
 27. Id. at 18.
 28. Id. at 22.
 29. Id. at 27.
 30. Id.
 31. Quoting amy allen, tHe PoWer of feminist tHeory: domination, resistance, solidarity 125 
(1999). Lukes later noted that such constraining power “must be a broader concept 
than domination” cited in lUkes, supra note 25, at 84), and introduced the notion of 
“beneficent power” where governments seek to prevent harm, e.g. the wearing of seat 
belts in cars, an acknowledgement that coercive power can be used at times for positive 
purposes in the interests of all. 
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In light of this, in what ways have power relations and structural in-
equalities constrained struggles for human rights in development contexts? 
Findings from the country studies confirm expectations that various forms of 
coercive power represent obstacles to securing rights, and that struggles for 
human rights are political struggles in which powerful economic and political 
interests often oppose and resist the claims for rights. Numerous examples 
of visible, hidden, and invisible manifestations of power in the country 
studies support these findings. In addition, this article considers whether 
any—or all—of the three forms of power are more prevalent in authoritarian 
systems (Zimbabwe, China) than in more liberal and transparent political 
systems (Ghana, Kenya, and South Africa). This article examines the three 
dimensions of power in three sub-sections below, while also highlighting the 
interaction and mutual reinforcement of different forms of power, described 
as the “nesting” of power.
A. Visible Power 
The country studies provide a wide variety of examples in which visible 
power constrained the struggle for rights. Various actors exercise visible 
power in all political contexts, although researchers differentiate its opera-
tion in situations of democratic and legitimate processes of decision making 
and in more repressive authoritarian contexts. Economic and social actors 
exercise visible power, as well as political ones. 
In Ghana, although the responsible (female) Minster for Women’s Affairs 
and some (mainly male) members of parliament vigorously opposed a bill to 
criminalize domestic violence by exerting their visible power in the legisla-
tive process, democratic political processes allowed NGO activists from the 
Coalition for Domestic Violence Legislation (DVC) to openly, and ultimately 
successfully, advocate for the bill. Importantly, this example also provides 
evidence of the nesting of power in hidden and invisible ways: opponents 
of the bill in parliament introduced hidden delays into the legislative process 
and invoked traditional patriarchal norms to suggest that the bill was against 
Ghanaian culture. Thus, an open and democratic political process did not 
prevent combined forms of power working against the advancement of hu-
man rights in the private sphere, with overt opposition by leading politicians 
nested inside covert political agenda-setting and the invisible, socialized 
notions of tradition and culture. In an autocratic context like Zimbabwe, 
the state exerted visible power in more repressive ways against women 
activists. Here, the police frequently disrupted and obstructed demonstra-
tions organized by Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA), with harassment 
of these women activists who demanded clean water, access to affordable 
education, and basic health services. 
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Visible power was also frequently evident in contexts of land distribution 
and land policies. In all country studies, irrespective of regime and political 
context, land issues were highly contentious, but took different forms ac-
cording to local conditions. In Kenya, land allocation became well known 
as a source of clientelism and self-enrichment by political and economic 
elites during the Kenyatta and Moi regimes from the mid 1960s to 2002. 
The Kenya Land Alliance (KLA) lobbied for a land policy during the last 
years of the Moi regime, and the regime responded with outright resistance. 
However, this visible power was nested inside clientelist networks of hid-
den power among regime supporters who had acquired huge tracts of land 
through political connections. Consequently, lawyers who took up land cases 
that challenged powerful landowners often experienced severe harassment.
Corporations also exerted visible power, often in combination with state 
power, in their opposition to rights-promoting organization activities that 
highlighted corporate violation of rights. In Ghana, the Wassa Association 
of Communities Affected by Mining (WACAM) attempted to defend local 
communities against the violation of various land and livelihood rights 
by transnational mining corporations engaging in large-scale surface gold 
mining. Combined corporate and state power was exercised to protect min-
ing companies through the deployment of both private security and state 
security forces against local community resistance. This led to a number of 
well-documented instances in which the military and police violently broke 
up peaceful protests by community members, resulting in serious injuries 
and hospitalization. One respondent expressed it thus: the government “has 
removed its sovereign cap and is now wearing a corporate cap.”32 In China, 
the NGO MWLARO,33 working for the rights of migrant workers, aimed at 
utilizing state power vis-à-vis corporate power, but actually experienced 
the weakness or the reluctance of the state to limit corporate power. In the 
early years of economic liberalization, state regulation of the labor market 
was weak, and corporations often took advantage of this, for instance by 
reducing or delaying payment of wages. This, however, ignited frequent 
disputes and altercations on company premises—attacking visible corporate 
power—which sometimes spilled over into demonstrations outside local 
government offices to protest against the lack of state support and regula-
tion. When MWLARO intervened and made demands on migrant workers’ 
behalf, it witnessed visible corporate power as intimidation and harassment 
of workers. Paradoxically, the weak regulation of the labor market gave vis-
ible corporate power greater scope to operate and demonstrated the relative 
 32. Gordon Crawford & Nana Akua Anyidoho, Ghana: Struggles for Rights in a Democratiz-
ing Context, in HUman rigHts, PoWer and civic action, supra note 24, at 88.
 33. The names of the three organizations studied in China have all been changed. Therefore 
this is not the organization’s real name or acronym.
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weakness of state power in relation to corporate power, even in the context 
of an autocratic party-state. 
It emerges from this analysis that the main source of visible power as 
a constraint on human rights protection and promotion is state power, at 
times in collusion with corporate power. It is clear that the state exerted 
visible power in all political contexts, although direct repression is more 
likely in autocratic contexts like Zimbabwe than in more liberal contexts 
such as Ghana. The assertion of rights that threaten state interests and those 
of clientelist groups, for instance land owners, are often subjected to the 
exertion of visible power, as is the advocacy of rights that threaten corporate 
interests, for example, in the extractive industries. 
b. Hidden Power 
Hidden power in the tradition of Lukes extends the scope of power to control 
over the political decision making agenda.34 It entails pulling strings behind 
the scenes, with the exertion of power to determine which issues are included 
in public discourse and in policy-making, and which are excluded. In many 
regimes the ruling elites exercise hidden power in closed forums, for instance 
in “kitchen cabinets” beyond public control and accountability. Such lack 
of transparency also undermines the scope for popular intervention and the 
voicing of concerns, and the lack of voice becomes particularly problematic 
when the exertion of hidden power is further used to manipulate politicians 
and the media. Numerous examples from the country studies reflect this.
The formulation of hidden deals without the knowledge of those con-
cerned was evident in South Africa. Nkuzi Development Association actively 
participated in land issues, including support for commercial farm workers. 
Yet Nkuzi’s advocacy for farm workers who had been laid off after protesting 
for their rights was constrained by the continued existence of the combined 
hidden power of government officials and white commercial farmers. Whereas 
Nkuzi had expected that, in a post-apartheid environment, government of-
ficials would provide support against the powers of farm employers, instead 
they experienced that white farm-owners continued to exercise hidden power 
in order to secure the collusion of officials.
The South African case-study also demonstrated the hidden power of 
patriarchy within male-dominated political and business environments, with 
obstacles to gender equality reflected in recruitment policies, career promo-
tion rates, and the manner in which authorities handled sexual harassment 
cases. The adverse impact of such patriarchal hidden power on struggles for 
women’s rights and gender equality was illustrated by the high level 2011 
 34. See lUkes, supra note 25, at 25. 
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appointment of a new Chief Justice in South Africa, an individual who had 
previously been criticized in the press for “condon[ing] brutal gender-based 
violence and sexual assault”35 after drastically reducing sentences for men 
convicted of domestic violence and marital rape. This sent a signal that such 
crimes and violations of women’s rights are not to be treated as serious issues.
In the repressive political environment of Zimbabwe, overt and covert 
power were combined in overall political harassment by the state. For 
instance, members of Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA) were not only 
subject to visible power through arrest for holding unlawful demonstrations, 
but then also subjected to beatings and nondiscernible torture like the “air 
chair” where injuries are hard to verify afterwards as torture. The latter is 
an example of extreme agenda-setting in the sense that torture is used to 
silence critics and opponents of the regime; they are physically assaulted, 
including in hidden ways, for demonstrating publicly against the regime’s 
violation of civil and political rights. 
Hidden power can also take the form of “local protectionism” where 
local power agents protect their principals. In China, in a case addressed by 
ZLAS,36 an organization advancing women’s rights, the local authority cov-
ered up an incident of sexual assault by concealing information to obstruct 
a claim for redress through the court system. The case was eventually heard 
“in camera,” and, in effect, condoned the protection of alleged perpetrators 
by influential civil servants. Similarly, the NGO MWLARO experienced the 
hidden power of the Chinese corporate sector when the rights of migrant 
workers were obstructed through nondisclosure of information about labor 
contracts. 
In Ghana, hidden corporate power was evident when mining compa-
nies wielded their ample financial resources to gain the support of various 
local power-holders, notably local governments and traditional authorities 
(chiefs). This, in turn, expanded the range of powerful opponents that the 
Wassa Association of Communities Affected by Mining (WACAM) faced as 
a small, community-based organization. In such instances, examples of hid-
den corporate power range from the legal (such as the provision of business 
contracts and undertaking public relations exercises) to the illegitimate and 
illegal (for instance, corrupt practices). Mining companies further exercised 
hidden power by manipulating Ghana’s parliament, though parliamentary 
members clearly colluded. For example, the parliamentary Select Commit-
tee on Environment, Science and Technology expressed its satisfaction with 
 35. Malcolm Langford, Bill Derman, Tsepho Madlingozi, Khulekani Moyo, Jackie Dugard, 
Anne Hellum & Shirhami Shirinda, South Africa: from Struggle to Idealism and Back 
Again, in HUman rigHts, PoWer and civic action, supra note 24, at 120 (2013).
 36. Lay Lee Tang, China: NGOs and Human Rights in Action, in HUman rigHts, PoWer and 
civic action, supra note 24, at 158. This is not the organization’s real name or acronym. 
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the environmental stewardship of mining giant AngloGold Ashanti Limited, 
ostensibly after a fact-finding visit to the area. Yet the Select Committee 
members did not actually visit the communities affected by mining. Rather, 
the mining company itself arranged for the Committee to meet selected 
opinion leaders as community representatives. Further, mining companies 
invited local MPs to sit on company boards in a clear conflict of interests, 
undermining MPs’ abilities to respond independently to their constituents’ 
concerns. Similarly in Kenya, fisher folk around Lake Naivasha in the Rift 
Valley suffered from behind-the-scenes lobbying and the use of hidden cor-
porate power by flower farmers and the Riparian Association who wanted 
to utilize the lake for tourism.
Transparency is a key feature of a human rights-based approach to 
development. Transparency reflects both intrinsic and instrumental human 
rights values. Citizens’ insight and oversight regarding issues of public con-
cern are important intrinsic values, enabling people to make informed and 
autonomous choices and live meaningful lives. Transparency is also impor-
tant in an instrumental way because it facilitates public debate about public 
concerns and enables people to make informed critiques. Hidden power 
as non-decision making37 stands at odds with these features of the human 
rights doctrine, excluding critical issues from being placed on the agenda 
and publicly discussed. The failure to develop land reforms is a typical ex-
ample in agrarian societies, as discussed in a number of the country studies. 
The neglect of the personal security of citizens in informal settlements is a 
serious urban rights issue, as demonstrated by the case study in the Kenya 
chapter of the Korogocho informal settlement in Nairobi. In both instances 
non-decision making is evident through the rights issues being kept off the 
agenda. Hidden power is harder to confront than visible power precisely 
because it is hidden and relatively unreachable. 
C. Invisible Power 
Invisible power is, as the term indicates, even harder to perceive, address, 
and contest. It manifests itself in attitudes, life views, and behavioral norms 
that are commonly embedded in societal traditions and customs. Norms and 
traditions are internalized through socialization and shape the way people 
behave individually and in social relations. Norms of invisible power may 
follow secular traditions or be religiously or culturally grounded. They may 
entail social and cultural practices that involve rights-abusing behavior (e.g. 
forced marriages, female genital mutilation, and so forth). Invisible power 
is often viewed as legitimate because it stems from world views embedded 
 37. See lUkes, supra note 25, at 22.
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in local ways of organizing social relations. However, from a human rights 
angle, not all cultural practices are legitimate; they may breach the physical 
and mental integrity of the individual or fundamental human rights norms of 
equality and nondiscrimination. Typical examples analyzed in the country 
cases entailed gender discrimination, particularly violence against women.
The latter was the case in Ghana, as illustrated by the battle over the 
Domestic Violence Bill from 2003 to 2007. Above, we described the resis-
tance of the responsible Minister as nested power, i.e., the visible power 
of the Minister nested inside the invisible power of socialized attitudes and 
behavior. The DVC recognized such invisible power and defined one of 
its main tasks as public education and awareness-raising in support of the 
Bill. Kenya provided another example of the power of tradition and culture 
related to further education for girls in the Borana tribe in the Korogocho 
settlement of Nairobi where the cultural demand of marriage at the age of 
sixteen limits girls’ education. The Miss Koch Initiative (MKI) has supported 
girls’ right to education and addressed various issues of culture and tradition, 
for instance, by establishing an education bursary program and by facilitating 
civic arbitration and dialogue among family members.
Similar to the Ghana and Kenya experiences, the Zimbabwe Women 
Lawyers Association (ZWLA) experienced invisible power in the private 
sphere as intersecting with visible and hidden power in the public sphere. 
In this case study, claims for women’s rights were mocked, silenced, and 
excluded from the political agenda and public discourse, in particular by 
media loyal to the regime, in both overt and covert ways. Simultaneously 
social norms of patriarchal domination existed as sources of invisible power 
in the family and caused further marginalization of women in social and 
public life. Thus, unequal power relations in the family constituted a central 
concern for ZWLA in their struggles for women’s rights. Similarly in South 
Africa, the invisible power of patriarchal domination is indicated by the fact 
that chiefs who exercise visible power are men, almost without exception; 
patriarchy pervades the institution of chieftaincy. 
In the Chinese context, the organizational studies revealed that invisible 
power is important in “stigmatizing the weak”38 so that they accept subjuga-
tion or exploitation. For instance, when rural migrants internalized prejudice 
against themselves as due to their inferior status, this, in turn, weakened their 
self-esteem and capability to mobilize against discrimination. Also in China, 
the visible power of local authority structures, for example village commit-
tees, often rests on features of discriminatory traditions and customs. The case 
study of the PCA,39 an NGO set up to advance participatory governance in 
urban communities, demonstrated that visible power nests inside invisible 
 38. See Tang, supra note 36, at 167.
 39. See id. at 178. This is not the organization’s real name or acronym.
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power structures. PCA’s attempts to encourage civic advocacy in order to 
enhance the state supported objective of participation in local governance 
(visible power) was undermined by the internalized negative perceptions 
of participation by the rural migrants themselves (invisible power) and their 
acceptance of authority structures. 
In practice, the invisible power of values, attitudes, and behavior found 
in various social and cultural practices is commonly not seen as domination. 
Rather, it is socially experienced as features that shape individual and col-
lective identity. In national constitutions, traditional customary practices can 
take precedence when coming into conflict with the right to gender equality. 
Human rights analyses of invisible power, however, demonstrate the nega-
tive nature of some customary practices and how they conflict with human 
rights principles of equality and nondiscrimination. Practices internalized 
through socialization (often in early childhood) are hard to transform; they 
are identity and cultural border guards that ensure social stability, at both 
personal and national levels. The challenge for a human rights-based power 
analysis is to reveal the discriminatory and repressive features of certain 
long-standing cultural practices and customs without totally undermining 
the legitimacy of the culture. 
D. Findings on Power Constraints
First, the country studies provided numerous illustrative examples of how 
different forms of power constrain struggles for human rights, and provided 
overwhelming confirmation of the article’s initial proposition that structures 
and relations of power constrain human rights advocacy and restrict the 
securing of rights for poor people in development contexts. Second, in all 
political contexts—ranging from relatively open and liberal to closed and 
hegemonic—human rights advocacy was constrained by all three dimen-
sions of power, although visible power was used in more repressive ways 
in authoritarian contexts. Third, while Lukes’ differentiation of these three 
forms of “power over” facilitated the article’s analysis, researchers discovered 
a more complex picture in which one form of power nests within another 
form, generally reinforcing each other. Nested power dynamics weaken 
democratic struggles to secure rights in more sophisticated ways than the 
mere use of direct pressure to limit rights. However, an open and democratic 
environment did make it more possible to challenge such instances of nested 
power dynamics and thus to seek to advance rights. 
Thus, we have seen how struggles for human rights have been con-
strained by structures and relations of power in numerous instances in the 
country studies. Consequently, in many instances struggles for rights were 
not successful, at least within the timeframe examined in the study, with 
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populations remaining deprived of important human rights. Nonetheless, 
what is significant for this evaluation of a human rights-based approach is 
the extent to which rights-promoting organizations develop a critical aware-
ness of such structures and relations of coercive power and whether they 
engage in struggles to challenge power inequalities.
III. CHALLENGING PowER? 
This section addresses the second of the three questions posed in the In-
troduction. First, the authors assess the extent to which rights-promoting 
organizations display a critical awareness of coercive power relations as a 
constraint on their human rights advocacy. Then the authors examine how 
successfully these organizations challenge power structures at local and 
national levels. 
The findings from the country case studies were mostly positive and indi-
cate that rights-promoting organizations often display a significant awareness 
of power inequalities and of the obstacles to the realization of rights posed 
by powerful actors. This awareness has been demonstrated by a variety of 
strategies that organizations adopted as a means to address unequal power 
relations. Three main strategies include: cooperation and collaboration with 
public authorities as duty-bearers; confrontation with power-holders such as 
the state; and alliance building with other nongovernmental actors. These 
are not watertight compartments, of course, and an organization may adopt 
a combination of strategies to suit differing circumstances, again indicating 
a degree of critical self-awareness and reflection on how to address power 
constraints.
A. Strategies of Cooperation 
An awareness of structures and relations of dominant power and their 
constraining effect on the realization of human rights does not necessar-
ily lead to conflict and contestation with power-holders. On the contrary, 
one common strategy by which an organization sought to secure rights 
involved cooperating and collaborating with power-holders, especially with 
government in its role as duty-bearer. The adoption of this strategy depends 
on a number of key factors, notably the political context and feasibility of 
cooperation or contestation, the nature of the particular human right, and 
the type of organization. 
Significantly, organizations sought to cooperate with government in 
both democratic and autocratic contexts. In differing authoritarian scenarios 
this could be for fairly pragmatic reasons (Zimbabwe) or because there was 
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virtually no choice (China), with confrontation not a realistic option. In Zim-
babwe, the ZWLA purposely worked with those selected individuals within 
the ruling party and government agencies, such as the police and judiciary, 
whom they perceived as relatively sympathetic to their cause, as illustrated 
by the training work undertaken with governmental agencies to implement 
the Domestic Violence Act. In China, the overwhelming dominance of the 
party-state meant that all three organizations had little option but to coop-
erate with those authorities in order to make some progress in advancing a 
human rights agenda. Yet such cooperation in China remained problematic 
and, despite organizations pushing outwards on the boundaries of what 
was possible, achievements were inevitably limited by what the authorities 
would allow. For instance, as a promoter of women’s rights, ZLAS had an 
awkward relationship with the official All China Women’s Federation (ACWF), 
which acted as a gatekeeper to the powerful party-state structures. On the 
one hand, ZLAS’s cooperation in collaborative projects with the Women’s 
Federation usually received tacit government approval. On the other hand, 
the subsidiary relationship of the Women’s Federation itself to the party-state 
was a significant constraint.
In democratic contexts, relatively open and accountable government 
meant that cooperation with government had a greater potential for success. 
In such contexts, adopting a cooperation strategy depended on the type of 
organization and the nature of the human rights work. Generally speaking, 
professional, legally-oriented organizations were more inclined to work 
within the system, and advocacy work on rights already established in law 
were more conducive to collaboration with government. Thus in Kenya, Kituo 
cha Sheria worked with the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs in 
developing paralegal training manuals and with the Ministry of Immigration 
on refugee law training. In South Africa, the Tshwaranang Legal Advocacy 
Centre’s (TLAC) work on gender-based violence entailed not only numerous 
submissions to parliamentary committees and government departments on 
various policy aspects, but it was also invited to assist with drafting legisla-
tion on domestic violence and rape protocol. In Ghana, the DVC’s campaign 
for legislation on domestic violence necessitated a degree of cooperation 
with governmental agencies, for example the Attorney General’s office in 
relation to legislative drafting, and demonstrated the often observed need 
to combine strategies of cooperation and confrontation, as discussed below. 
The strategy of cooperation remained problematic, however, and subject 
to criticism at times from within human rights movements for being too close 
to governments that were seen either as violators of rights or unresponsive 
to rights demands. Interestingly, this critique was particularly evident in 
China, despite this being an especially difficult context for rights-promoting 
organizations to operate in a more confrontational manner. For instance, 
MWLARO, in working to promote the rights of rural migrant workers, chose 
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to cooperate with state power structures in China, partly as a means to chal-
lenge corporate power, its main target. Yet such collaboration also led to 
criticism of MWLARO from other NGOs for being too close to government. 
Similarly, PCA was criticized for “doing the work of the government,”40 but 
countered that they were merely working within the parameters of what was 
possible in encouraging more participatory governance.
b. Strategies of Confrontation 
In the face of opposition and resistance to demands for rights, and the 
exertion of power to deny such demands, organizations often adopted a 
strategy of confrontation with government and other power-holders. Again 
the adoption of this strategy depended partly on the nature of the particular 
human right and the type of organization.
Demonstrations and public protests were the most common methods 
of expressing demands more forcibly. Here, the nature of the organization 
was especially relevant. If more legally-oriented organizations have shown 
more propensity to adopt a strategy of cooperation with power-holders, 
then more radical and politically-oriented organizations have been more 
inclined to adopt a strategy of confrontation. One illustration is Abahlali 
base Mjondolo, the shack dwellers movement in South Africa, who struggle 
for the socioeconomic rights of those living in informal settlements, espe-
cially through public demonstrations and rallies. The relatively democratic 
context of South Africa, especially with its long history of struggle against 
Apartheid has, on the one hand, enabled such protests. On the other hand, 
Abahlali’s marches and demonstrations have frequently been declared illegal 
and subjected to violent responses from the state, indicating the limits to 
democratic challenges to the ruling ANC party in South Africa. In Zimba-
bwe, where the political context became increasingly autocratic from 2000 
onward, WOZA sustained its organization of public demonstrations and 
collective actions against the curtailment of civil and political rights and 
for basic socio-economic rights, despite the violent response from the state. 
Here WOZA’s principled stance of nonviolent direct action was especially 
important and enhanced the legitimacy of their protests, although it did not 
prevent the regular arrest, detention, and brutalization of their members. 
WACAM in Ghana also explicitly adopted the principle of nonviolence in 
all its public protests against the alleged rights abuses and environmental 
degradation committed by transnational mining companies. Despite the rela-
tively democratic context, such protests were met at times by violence from 
both company private security and state security forces, again an indicator 
 40. See id. at 179.
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of democratic deficits in Ghana. 
However, it was not only the more community-based and militant or-
ganizations that engaged in strategies of confrontation. In Kenya, the KLA 
mobilized affected groups to challenge Nairobi City Council when it wanted 
to relocate small-scale traders in order to purportedly “decongest” the cen-
tral business district of the city in 2008. The City Council did not consult 
the small traders and this led to demonstrations and protests demanding 
the accountability of public decision-makers to those whose incomes and 
livelihoods were under threat. 
The DVC in Ghana provides an interesting example of the mixing of 
strategies of cooperation and confrontation. Its successful campaign from 
2003 to 2007 to achieve the passage of the Domestic Violence Bill entailed 
cooperation with identifiable allies in parliament and government while also 
engaging in a strategy of confrontation with the Bill’s opponents. Described 
by a DVC member as “a big fight,”41 DVC’s battle with the Minister of Women 
and Children, eventually resulted in the replacement of the minister and thus 
the removal of the major public opponent of the Bill. The DVC ran a very 
astute campaign, one that involved amassing the support of potential allies 
within governmental circles while simultaneously countering opponents 
through a variety of tactics and activities in the public domain. 
C. building Alliances and Networks 
When confronted with power inequalities and the obstacles to securing 
rights posed by power-holders, a third common strategy was the building 
of alliances and networks amongst rights-promoting organizations in order 
to enhance their own countervailing power. The Ghana study provided 
interesting and contrasting examples. 
WACAM is a remarkable example of a small, community-based orga-
nization that has had significant impact in its struggles against extremely 
powerful opponents, namely transnational gold mining companies and the 
government of Ghana. It achieved this partly by successfully fostering im-
portant linkages with like-minded organizations nationally and internation-
ally.42 The alliances with international NGOs have protected WACAM, to a 
degree, in its opposition to both wealthy corporations and a government that 
remains protective of corporate interests, given its reliance on tax revenue. 
The campaign for domestic violence legislation illustrated another type 
 41. Crawford & Anyidoho, supra note 24, at 106.
 42. Nana Akua Anyidoho & Gordon Crawford, Leveraging National and Global Links for 
Local Rights Advocacy: WACAM’s Challenge to the Power of Transnational Gold Min-
ing in Ghana, 35 canadian J. dev. stUd. 483 (2014).
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of successful networking. Several women’s rights organizations formed the 
Coalition for Domestic Violence Legislation (DVC), and the research found 
that “the strength of the whole was greater than the sum of the parts in 
bringing about change.”43 Interestingly, and unlike WACAM, the Coalition 
did not seek to strengthen their campaign through external linkages with 
similar campaigns elsewhere, perhaps confident in its own ability to press 
for legislative change in Ghana. However, given that the capacity of the 
DVC faltered after the legislation’s introduction, the longer-term effective-
ness of such coalitions was questioned in which the primary commitment 
of member organizations was inevitably to their own programs. It was found 
that member organizations of the Coalition re-focused on their own core 
activities after the success of achieving legislative change, but which left 
many implementation issues unresolved. 
Alliances and networks proved their worth in both autocratic and 
democratic contexts. In China, ZLAS initiated networks of women lawyers 
and bar associations to encourage more lawyers to take up public interest 
cases involving women’s rights. Similarly, MWLARO facilitated a network 
of lawyers who took on pro-bono and legal aid cases for migrant workers. 
In Zimbabwe, the human rights networks and associations in which Zim-
babwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR) and Zimbabwe Women Lawyers 
Association (ZWLA) participated were critical in lobbying against the 2004 
Non-governmental Organisation Bill.44 In Kenya, Kituo cha Sheria stated 
that networking with other organizations provided “strength in numbers” in 
mobilizing people and raising awareness. Kituo’s lobbying for a housing bill 
is one example of building a coalition with other organizations and political 
forces to influence the government’s position. In a contrasting example from 
South Africa, however, Abahlali draws attention to a potential disadvantage 
of participating in broader networks, taking a conscious decision against 
doing so in order to retain its own independence and autonomy, including 
in its choice of strategies and actions.
In sum, organizations often displayed considerable awareness of the 
powerful forces that constrain the realization of human rights and, at times, 
violate human rights. They also showed tactical ability in their choice of 
strategic responses to the power constraints encountered. Some adopt a more 
confrontational strategy, though always remaining nonviolent, while others 
seek to cooperate with power-holders and thus to persuade government or 
other authorities to act as rights duty-bearers. In relatively democratic con-
texts, available strategic choices are more numerous and decisions tend to 
 43. Id.
 44. The NGO Bill (2004) required registration of NGOs by a government-controlled Council 
and prohibited Zimbabwean NGOs from receiving any foreign funding to engage in 
human rights work, while banning foreign human rights NGOs.
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reflect the nature of the organization: community-based and membership-
based organizations adopt a confrontational approach more frequently; while 
the professional NGOs, especially legally-orientated ones, were likely to 
work within the system and seek to persuade rather than challenge govern-
ment and other power-holders. The type of rights being advocated for also 
influenced organizations’ decision making on strategy, with women’s rights 
in the legal sphere seemingly less controversial and often enabling a more 
collaborative relationship with government.
Political context was significant in shaping the opportunities available to 
nongovernmental actors, yet not always as influential or as determining as 
anticipated. The case-study of China provided a useful illustrative example. 
Here a direct challenge to the party-state was clearly not an option, and the 
authoritarian context did play a major role in limiting what was possible. 
Yet, the country study also illustrated the innovative ways in which rights-
promoting organizations skillfully negotiated with the party-state within the 
overall authoritarian context. The study organizations capitalized on the 
official rhetoric about human rights, and thereby pushed the limits of what 
was possible while showing considerable awareness that to push too far 
would threaten their own survival. 
IV. TRANSFoRMING PowER STRUCTURES?
This section focuses on the last question that contributes to the overall as-
sessment of human rights-based approaches: to what extent have human 
rights-promoting organizations successfully transformed power structures 
and secured rights, especially for poor and marginalized people? 
Before embarking on this analysis, however, some preliminary points 
are necessary. First, assessing whether transformation occurred must take the 
timeframe into consideration. In other words, a process of transformation 
may occur over a fairly long period of time and can only be fully assessed 
after that time period. It is possible that such a period of time may not have 
elapsed in cases considered here. Second, it is evident that not all case 
study organizations sought transformative change, but were reform-oriented 
and opted to work for more limited change within existing structures. The 
majority of our case study organizations probably fall into this category, and 
indicate a self-limitation of a human rights-based approach and undermine its 
potential as a “more progressive, radical even, approach to development.”45 
Third, it is necessary to differentiate between different forms of transforma-
tion, notably political and social. Whereas some organizations may have 
 45. Cornwall & Nyamu-Musembi, Putting the “Rights-Based Approach,” supra note 5, at 
1418. 
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accepted the political status quo, especially in more democratic contexts, 
they may still have sought to transform power relations in social contexts, 
especially those of invisible power. The DVC in Ghana is a good illustration 
of this distinction. It did not seek to change structures of political power as 
such, but did aim at a transformation of cultural values and behavior in line 
with gender equality and women’s right to freedom from violence. 
Altering power structures, whether visible, hidden or invisible, is far from 
straightforward. This is especially so given that those powerful institutions 
and actors that oppose demands for rights will extend their opposition to 
any attempt to change the prevailing power inequalities that sustain their 
interests. Thus, structural changes are often limited and structural constraints 
continue to prevail, yet organizations can at least learn how to better stra-
tegically relate to power structures by increasing their awareness of them. 
Hence, the authors identified processes in which civic actors engaged in 
struggles for social change through rights-based activities, and this section 
explores the nature and significance of changes achieved by the organizations 
in the country studies in terms of legislation, public policies, institutional 
structures, and cultural attitudes.
A. Legislative Changes 
Our country cases demonstrated a number of positive examples of legislative 
reforms that contribute to the protection of various human rights, especially 
in the areas of women’s rights and land rights. Regarding women’s rights, the 
success of the DVC in Ghana in achieving its principle goal, the enactment 
of the Domestic Violence Act in 2007, constituted a significant achievement. 
Likewise in Zimbabwe, ZWLA lobbied for law reform on domestic violence, 
working with both government and civil society and, as a result, the Domestic 
Violence Act was adopted in 2006. In South Africa, the government invited 
TLAC to draft the rape protocol as part of the Criminal Justice Review pro-
cess. In China, ZLAS was able to influence discourses on legal reform, with 
an emerging legal framework on women’s rights and freedom from sexual 
harassment. Organizations working for women’s rights are well represented 
in our case sample and one clear finding is that they are amongst the most 
successful, especially in terms of achieving legislative change. Explanations 
of this could be a combination of the determined advocacy of women’s 
organizations, especially those of women lawyers, and that women’s rights 
are less threatening to governments, at least at the legislative level. 
Land rights were also asserted in a number of country studies, yet 
achieving change here has been more difficult. In Kenya, the Kenya Land 
Alliance (KLA) and Kituo cha Sheria contributed to the drafting process of 
the new constitution’s section on land and land ownership, while in South 
Vol. 37682 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY
Africa, Nkuzi pressurized the government regarding the implementation of 
the Land Restitution Act and played a role in opposing the Communal Land 
Rights Act, perceived as contradicting a human rights approach. Otherwise 
more significant legislative changes were not secured.
Research also indicates failures to achieve legislative change. For in-
stance BelimWusa Development Association (BEWDA) was unsuccessful in 
its attempt to create a local by-law on violence against women at district 
level in the Upper East region of Ghana. This was due to the inability to get 
both the District Assembly and the traditional paramount chief to approve 
the by-law, a task that itself required a degree of persistence and a level 
of outlay of human and financial resources that proved very difficult for a 
small organization to sustain. Even a clear example of success, the DVC in 
Ghana, contained an inherent warning that struggles for rights always remain 
ongoing, especially where structural obstacles remain largely intact. It was 
apparent that the same male-dominated political structures of government and 
parliament that had delayed the Bill’s enactment, especially through hidden 
and invisible power, continued to impede the implementation of the Act. 
b. Public Policy Changes
The difficulty in altering and transforming power structures is also evident 
where attempting to affect change in public policies. Such difficulty is es-
pecially severe in authoritarian contexts in which government is relatively 
unaccountable and immune to societal pressure, and the research found no 
evidence of significant impact on public policy in either China or Zimbabwe. 
In relatively democratic contexts, there is some evidence of policy impact, 
albeit limited. In Kenya, the KLA was able to influence parliament’s deci-
sion to order the government to open access routes for local fisher folks to 
Lake Naivasha and to shape policy on land reform. The Miss Koch Initiative 
had some influence on land policy, notably through collaboration with the 
Residents Association in the Korogocho slum. In South Africa, Abhalali had 
some impact on local government housing policy, in particular the 2009 
Memorandum of Understanding in which Durban City Council committed to 
providing interim services to fourteen informal settlements and a permanent 
upgrade of five settlements. The study of WACAM in Ghana provided an ex-
ample where it proved more straightforward to achieve policy change at the 
regional level in West Africa, with some subsequent impact at the national 
level. WACAM participated in the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) Task Force which drew up a “Directive on Harmonization 
of Guiding Principles and Policies on Mining,” subsequently adopted by the 
government of Ghana. However, actual changes in the government’s min-
ing policy were less evident and the country study concludes that neither 
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WACAM nor the wider nongovernmental National Coalition on Mining were 
able to affect any fundamental change in state policies towards the gold min-
ing industry.46 This is perhaps unsurprising given the huge financial interests 
involved, both in terms of the vast profits made by the transnational mining 
companies and the tax revenue, albeit limited in comparison, received by 
the government. Such combined corporate and state power does not bend 
easily and thus local communities living in poverty continued to suffer the 
adverse consequences of large-scale surface mining.
C. Institutional Changes
Achieving change in institutional structures towards greater protection or 
promotion of human rights was again more possible in democratic contexts 
than in authoritarian ones, albeit in limited instances. In Ghana, the imple-
mentation of the Domestic Violence Act entailed the creation of a Domestic 
Violence Secretariat within the Ministry of Women and Children’s Affairs 
and the formation of a Victims of Domestic Violence Management Board, 
on which the DVC got representation. However, limited progress in opera-
tionalizing these new structures was evident, especially as the Board existed 
within the same male-dominated institutions of government that resisted the 
enactment of the Bill, while the Coalition’s advocacy efforts proved difficult 
to sustain. In Kenya, the government invited both MKI and KLA to take part in 
negotiating the new institutional framework for land policy, and MKI further 
facilitated and supported the establishment of village oversight committees. 
A new land policy was an important institutional development at national 
level, and the oversight committees played an important role at the local 
level in demanding political accountability for the use of devolved funds.
In more authoritarian contexts, there is little or no evidence of organi-
zations affecting institutional change. A case-in-point is the conclusion of 
the Zimbabwe study which stated that, “The three organizations’ ability to 
affect the economic structures that enable ZANU PF to control the police, 
the courts and the military has been limited.”47 
 46. Crawford & Anyidoho, supra note 24, at 110.
 47. Anne Hellum, Bill Derman, Geoff Feltoe, Ellen Sithole, Julie Stewart & Amy Tsanga, Rights 
Claiming and Rights Making in Zimbabwe: A Study of Three Human Rights NGOs, in 
HUman rigHts, PoWer and civic action, supra note 24, at 48.
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D. Cultural Changes
Invisible power inherent in various cultural norms and traditions and internal-
ized through socialization constituted a significant obstacle for many of the 
organizations studied in this project. The organizations sought to counter this 
invisible power through awareness raising and working towards changes in 
social attitudes. Of the four areas of change identified here, affecting such 
cultural change is probably the most challenging to achieve. Yet, paradoxi-
cally, it is perhaps the area where there exists more evidence of success and 
where the overall political context least affects the prospects for success. 
In China, the unfavorable macro-political context did not prevent ZLAS 
from raising awareness of women’s rights in relation to sexual harassment 
and land rights. In Zimbabwe, processes of change at the level of norms and 
attitudes occurred in two different ways. First, research found that ZWLA’s 
activities in defense of women’s rights in the domestic sphere had weakened 
the socio-cultural legitimacy of male superiority and privilege embedded 
in formal and informal customary norms. This was achieved through mak-
ing “invisible power visible by addressing power relations in the family.”48 
Second, WOZA’s civic education program was observed as having changed 
people’s attitudes so that they felt emboldened and prepared to take part in 
civic actions and demonstrations. 
In both Ghana and Kenya the more open political context made little 
difference to the persistent challenge posed by patriarchal culture and other 
ingrained social attitudes towards oppressed and vulnerable groups. Yet 
campaigns by the organizations did achieve some positive changes from a 
human rights perspective. In Ghana, the DVC’s nationwide public education 
and consultation campaign generated widespread public attention on an issue 
that previously had not been salient in public discourse, thereby significantly 
raising public awareness and attitudinal change concerning violence against 
women. BEWDA worked in an environment where traditional beliefs and 
practices remained strong, yet sought to change social attitudes in relation 
to women’s rights and the social exclusion of people with disabilities. Such 
changes are inevitably slow and gradual, but in both of these organizational 
studies researchers noted a degree of success. In Kenya, all three organiza-
tions sought to raise awareness and knowledge about rights issues and thus 
contributed to cultural change that is more receptive to the protection and 
promotion of human rights. In particular, Kituo cha Seria raised issues of 
gender inequality on its own local radio station and addressed the rights of 
girls and women within the family in an attempt to change local traditions 
and customs.
 48. Id. at 46.
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Patriarchal culture and its inherent power relations is very difficult to 
change. Yet these findings do indicate a degree of success of human rights 
based strategies in this area. Why is this? It could be partly explained by a 
“selection bias” in selecting organizations working for women’s rights in all 
country case-studies, and thus the likelihood of highlighting some positive 
examples is increased. Yet the achievements are also explained by the politi-
cal commitment and determination exhibited by a range of organizations, 
some more professional and legally-oriented and others more community-
based, to contest gender inequalities at all levels and thus to seek cultural 
transformation through changed norms, attitudes, and behavior.
In sum, this study has highlighted some changes to power structures in 
ways that reduce power asymmetries that disadvantage poor and relatively 
marginal people, as well as some progress in securing rights. Nonetheless, 
there are two major qualifications. First, not all case study organizations 
sought transformative change, either in political structures or in societal 
culture, and therefore changes achieved are often limited by the aims and 
outlook of the organizations themselves. Second, even where sought, social 
transformation is difficult to realize. Whether the changes outlined here 
amount to transformative change or not remains an open question, though 
one that is difficult to answer affirmatively. Organizations have often struggled 
purposefully and determinedly for social change, and have experienced some 
success, yet changes have been limited and power imbalances remain, as 
do the power constraints on rights-based advocacy.
V. CoNCLUSIoN
This discussion began with the premise that academics and practitioners 
dealing with rights and development issues have tended to overlook the 
important dimensions of power and politics and how these dimensions affect 
human rights advocacy. Further, these shortcomings, if not addressed, could 
lead to the human rights-based approach becoming another failed develop-
ment strategy. What overall assessment can now be made on the relative 
success or failure of a rights-based approach, and how can the prospects for 
realizing human rights and development for poor and marginalized people 
be enhanced?
The findings from the research strongly affirmed how different forms of 
coercive power limit and constrain the human rights agency of nongovern-
mental actors, and thus act as an obstacle to the securing of human rights. 
The authors also noted, more positively, how many organizations display 
considerable awareness of such powerful forces. The researchers explored 
how rights-promoting organizations endeavored to challenge different di-
mensions and manifestations of power through applying a range of strategies 
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and tactics. Overall, however, although the organizations experienced some 
success, the changes are often limited and difficult to describe as transforma-
tive, with power imbalances remaining and exerting ongoing constraints on 
human rights advocacy. Assessing the relative success or failure of a human 
rights-based approach has therefore led to somewhat equivocal conclusions. 
On the one hand, the country studies have confirmed the significance of 
dominant power structures as an impediment to human rights realization 
and that, as a result, the claims for rights have met with limited success. 
On the other hand, in their rights advocacy, civil society organizations have 
often demonstrated persistence and determination in challenging powerful 
entrenched interests, which cannot simply be dismissed as failure. In respond-
ing to such ambivalence, we finish by identifying four conditions by which 
the success of a rights-based approach could be improved, ones which focus 
on the significance of putting power and politics at the center of analysis.
The first condition for success is self-reflexivity. The findings indicate the 
importance of a politically grounded analysis of the obstacles to securing 
rights, including identification of who opposes rights demands, and what are 
the embedded structures and processes that deny rights. It is also apparent 
that such analysis is not only necessary at the level of visible power, but at 
the more concealed levels of hidden and invisible power. The findings, of 
course, did indicate that many organizations displayed critical awareness of 
their position in society and their relationship to power, and that this was 
crucial for sustaining claims for human rights in the face of powerful oppo-
sition. Interestingly, the organizations in China demonstrated a particularly 
high degree of reflexivity in the manner they shrewdly negotiated with the 
party-state and its front organizations and navigated the spaces between the 
national and local power structures. However, such reflexivity was important 
in all political contexts. In a relatively open and democratic context, the DVC 
in Ghana displayed a high level of awareness of the obstacles faced from 
different forms of visible, hidden and invisible power, and this awareness 
was crucial to the way the organization campaigned simultaneously on a 
number of fronts. It engaged in a “big fight” with the Minister for Women’s 
Affairs who was the highest-ranking visible opponent of the bill on domestic 
violence, which led to her removal as a Minister and the eventual success 
of the bill. The DVC also showed remarkable inventiveness in undertak-
ing a range of public activities aimed at challenging less visible aspects of 
patriarchal power and changing associated cultural values and attitudes.
A second condition for success is to translate that reflexivity and political 
analysis into strategic actions that aim to challenge and reduce the influence 
of such powerful actors and to address power inequalities. This transforms 
reflection on and awareness of dominant power structures into agency. Find-
ings demonstrate that some organizations displayed considerable agency and 
tactical ability in their choice of strategic responses to the power constraints 
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encountered. One key strategic choice entails when to confront and challenge 
authorities and when to collaborate with power-holders, and with whom. 
The political context is significant, of course, in shaping the opportunities 
available, yet it was found that options in authoritarian contexts were not 
as limited as anticipated. For instance, in China, while a direct challenge to 
the party-state was clearly not feasible, the rights-promoting organizations 
skillfully negotiated with the party-state, capitalized on the official rhetoric 
about human rights, and thereby pushed the limits of what was possible. 
In other authoritarian contexts, notably Zimbabwe, civic actors like 
WOZA bravely challenged government and refused to accept the curtail-
ment of freedoms of assembly and expression. Findings also indicated, less 
positively perhaps, that some organizations limited their own strategic choices 
and opted not to address power inequalities. The type of organization is sig-
nificant here, with professional, legally-orientated NGOs more likely to work 
within the system and seek to persuade rather than challenge government 
and other power-holders. While such a legalistic approach undoubtedly has 
its place and can lead to certain benefits, especially for individuals, it is un-
likely to change the balance of power in society, and here arises a reminder 
of Peter Uvin’s statement that a human rights legal approach can be “a safe, 
legal, technical conduit to avoid the real issues of power and politics.”49 In 
contrast, community-based and membership-based organizations have been 
more disposed to adopt a confrontational and overtly political approach, 
one that sought to secure rights and transform power relations through 
social and political struggles. This was evident in the cases of Abahlali, 
WACAM, WOZA, and KLA in each of the African country studies. Perhaps 
significantly, the membership of such organizations is mainly comprised of 
rights-deprived people who have generally demonstrated greater awareness 
of the need to challenge and contest extant power structures if they are to 
realize their rights. 
A third condition for success is to build up countervailing power, again 
focusing on the agency of rights-promoting organizations and how they can 
tackle the demanding task of changing power structures. We were critical at 
the outset of the empowerment rhetoric’s pre-eminence within rights-based 
approaches, to the relative neglect of coercive power and the constraints 
on rights-based advocacy. That critique stands. The findings, however, also 
recognize the importance of positive power and empowerment, especially 
in the context where rights-promoting organizations purposefully strengthen 
their own countervailing power in order to challenge entrenched powerful 
interests. Such positive power is often referred to as “power to,” and indeed 
was recognized by Lukes in the revised edition of his classic work as the 
 49. See Uvin, supra note 1, at 140.
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“power to bring about such and such an outcome.”50 An effective way of 
strengthening “power to” was by entering into networks and alliances with 
other organizations. Here, different spaces for political participation, espe-
cially those referred to as popular spaces51 or claimed or created spaces,52 
can play a significant role as places where civil society organizations come 
together more autonomously in processes of social mobilization and alliance 
formation in order to enhance their own collective powers. 
A continuum of such spaces for engagement by civil society actors has 
been identified, including participation with decision-makers in “invited 
spaces” and attempts to pry open “closed spaces.”53 Yet to avoid engaging 
with powerful elite actors on highly unequal terms where officially invited, 
for instance, it would seem essential for civil society organizations to initially 
strengthen their own countervailing power in more autonomous spaces. This 
was highlighted in the country studies where organizations strengthened their 
capacity and that of human rights movements in created spaces, often prior 
to public action and possible con frontation with public authorities. In Kenya, 
KLA created spaces in which it educated local communities on their rights 
concerning land issues and thus facilitated the subsequent pursuit of such 
rights, while Miss Koch Initiative used radio (Koch FM) and theatre (Pendo 
Theatre) to create autonomous spaces in which it raised awareness of girls’ 
and children’s rights. In South Africa, Abahlali created spaces for demo cratic 
participation and collective decision-making within the movement itself, 
including the establishment of the University of Abahlali baseMjondolo 
where people collectively share experiences and knowledge, and engage 
in intellectual work and writing. In Ghana, WACAM countered the huge 
power asymmetry it faced in relation to transnational mining companies by 
building national and international alliances with politically like-minded 
organizations, serving not only to enhance WACAM’s impact but also to 
provide some protection against possible reprisals from the powerful interests 
that they opposed.54 Such building of countervailing power in created spaces 
not only increases the ability of rights promoting organizations to engage 
with powerful actors and institutions in other spaces, but it also serves to 
enhance the self-esteem and assertiveness of relatively powerless people and 
thus to contest the invisible power of sociali zation that can reinforce and 
maintain structures of social subordination and rights deprivation.
 50. See lUkes supra note 25, at 72.
 51. Andrea Cornwall, Introduction: New Democratic Spaces? The Politics and Dynamics 
of Institutionalised Participation, 35 ids bUll. 1, 2 (2004).
 52. John Gaventa, Finding the Spaces for Change: A Power Analysis, 37 ids bUll. 23, 27 
(2006).
 53. Id. See lUkes supra note 25, at 72.
 54. Nana Akua Anyidoho & Gordon Crawford, Leveraging Global Linkages for Local Rights 
Advocacy: WACAM’s Challenge to the Power of Transnational Gold Mining in Ghana, 
35 canadian J. dev. stUd. 483 (2014)
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The fourth and final condition for success of a rights-based approach to 
development relates to the overarching argument concerning the importance 
of putting power and politics back at the center of analysis. We concur with 
the analysis by Mander that an “understanding of poverty as the outcome 
of the active denial of people’s rights implies a rejection of understanding 
development as a neutral process, and instead an acknowledgement of its 
political content.”55 We also agree with Gready that “rights activists [need 
to] take sides and challenge vested interests and asymmetries of power.”56 
This research confirms the importance of recognizing struggles for rights 
as power struggles and political struggles. This discussion does not seek to 
belittle the legal orientation of some organizations examined here, for in-
stance those which focus on defending existing legal rights through judicial 
processes. Indeed, we would concur with Samuel Hickey and Diana Mitlin 
that “lawyers and the law can be powerful allies for poor and marginal 
groups.”57 However, this research has also demonstrated that a legalistic 
approach is not sufficient to secure human rights or to fight for new rights.58 
Rights-promoting organizations must engage with democratic politics in 
the sense of mobilizing rights-deprived groups, building alliances between 
like-minded organizations, holding public protests, and generally advocat-
ing for the rights of people living in poverty and of other marginalized 
groups. This is not politics in a narrow political party and partisan sense. 
It is political action in the public sphere that contests the active denial of 
rights by powerful actors and by the economic and social structures that 
privilege them. Importantly, it is political action underpinned by human rights 
principles59—equality and nondiscrimination, participation and inclusion, 
accountability, and nonviolence.
The country cases confirm the significance of dominant power as an 
obstacle to the securing of rights, and thus many claims for rights had limited 
success. If there is a lack of recognition by rights-promoting organizations 
of the malevolent role of coercive power, or a lack of conviction to counter 
it, then a human rights-based approach is likely to be “tamed” and “depo-
liticized”60 and thus doomed not to bring about the changes in policies and 
in society that it aims to achieve. Nonetheless, this article suggests that, by 
 55. Harsh Mander, Rights as Struggle: Towards a More Just and Humane World, in reinvent-
ing develoPment?, supra note 2, at 241–42 (emphasis added).
 56. See Gready, supra note 9, at 743.
 57. See Hickey & mitlin, supra note 4, at 219. 
 58. Cf. Bård A. Andreassen, Legal Empowerment of the Poor: Social Prerequisites?, in HU-
man rigHts in tHe neW millenniUm: toWards a tHeory of cHange (Paul Gready & Wouter 
Vandenhole eds., 2013).
 59. Urban Jonsson, A Human Rights-Based Approach to Programming, in reinventing develoP-
ment?, supra note 2, at 47. 
 60. Srilatha Batliwala, Taking the Power out of Empowerment: An Experiential Account, 17 
dev. Practice 557 (2007).
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putting power back at the center of analysis and by recognizing struggles for 
rights as political struggles, then rights-based approaches can not only secure 
progress in realizing rights for people living in poverty, but also strive for 
structural change where the balance of power is tilted away from powerful 
elites and towards the mass of rights-deprived people.
